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Abstract  
The fear of fraud is constant. Unfortunately, now more than ever before, fraud is being committed by employees 
on the inside, the very people who are supposed to be supporting and protecting an organization. Even though 
the financial industry is one of the most regulated, financial institution are still getting with the highest rate of 
internal fraud. Insider threat has always existed within each Financial Institution. In the recent years, insider threat 
has become a more prominent issue because of the emerging trends in the workplace. This change to a more 
flexible and productive workplace environment allows employees to easily gain access to an organization’s 
critical and sensitive information. While the risk of insider threat has certainly increased, Financial Institution 
have not deployed enough controls to mitigate this risk either because they believe that the frequency of such 
threat is very low or because they feel powerless to do so. 
 This paper tends to employ techniques that would abate the spate of Insider fraud and cybercrime on customer 
transactions and insider processing which is in full compliance with most regulatory mandate of Countries 
Government bank.  
Keywords: Insider threat, insider fraud, Incidence response, Log, monitor, crime. 
1.0 Introduction  
Black law Dictionary (6th Edition, 1990) defines fraud as “An intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of 
inducing another relying upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right. 
A false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegation or 
by concealment of that which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his 
legal injury. Anything calculated to deceive, whether by a single act or a combination or by suppression of truth 
or suggestion of what is false whether it be by direct falsehood or innuendo, by speech or silence, word of 
mouth, look or gesture.” 
This definition has not changed, rather fraud has become sophisticated and IT driven which makes its detection 
more arduous.   
Fraud in the banking sector is estimated at billions of naira annually, and diverts resources from organization’s 
profitability objectives as fraud losses reduce the amount of profit that would otherwise be available to 
shareholders. Fraud also undermines public confidence in banks as losses could be of monies belonging to 
bank’s customers. Fraud losses can also impact negatively upon staff morale as the benefit of value created by 
dedicated and hardworking staff is lost to fraud incidents. Fraud impair the bank’s financial health and constrains 
its ability to carry out its business of lending and investment, and in extreme instances, fraud losses can lead to 
insolvency. Financial institutions are now committed to ensuring probity and accountability to its shareholders, 
customers, and employees, by building a positive organizational culture that deters, prevents, promptly detects, 
investigates and takes steps to correct deficiencies that could lead to fraud.  
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Insider fraud is perpetrated by a malicious insider, which is a current or former employee, contractor, or other 
business partner who has or had authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data and 
intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality. 
 Essentially, insider fraud takes place when someone uses his/her position within an organization to steal money 
or information and/or to threaten security, insider fraud is “the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment 
through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets.” 
Perpetrators are often employees or contractors who gain access to data and use it to commit fraud. 
Unfortunately, because these people have usually been screened during the employment process and “vetted” 
by the organization, they’ve been given access to important information as part of their job, so it’s more 
challenging for companies to catch. 
Insider fraud are costliest and hardest to detect of all data breaches Jasmine Henry (2018). Two-thirds of total 
data records compromised in 2017 were the result of inadvertent insiders, according to “2018 IBM X-Force 
Threat Intelligence index,” and insider threats are the cause of 60 percent of cyberattacks. Meanwhile, 
misconfigured cloud servers and networked backup incidents caused by employee negligence collectively 
exposed over 2 billion records last year. 
While organizations focus significant resources on the mitigation of external threat actors, insider risks are likely 
to pose an even greater financial threat to the enterprise. According to Ponemon Institute’s “2018 Cost of Insider 
Threats” report, the average cost of insider-caused incidents was $8.76 million in 2017 — more than twice 
the $3.86 million global average cost of all breaches during the same year. 
Accordingly, to Jasmine Henry (2018), Traditional approaches to managing insider threats have focused 
extensively on the use of awareness training and access governance to reduce risks. While these activities are 
critically important, they’re likely not enough to mitigate all types of employee risk. Humans are enormously 
variable, and failing to account for all types of insiders could result in costly security incidents. 
1.2 Type of Insider Fraud  
Insider fraud can take place in almost any organization, but two industries where it’s common – and highly 
damaging for both employers and consumers – are banking and insurance. In these organizations, employees 
have access to extremely sensitive and personal data, including customers’ social security numbers, account 
information, driving and criminal records, etc., which can lead to identity theft and the loss of funds.  
• Nonresponders: A small but significant percentage of the employee population is made up of 
nonresponders to awareness training exercises. While these users may not intend to behave negligently, 
they’re among the riskiest members of the population since their behaviors can fit consistent patterns. In 
2017, Verizon found that an average 4.2 percent of people targeted in any given phishing campaign will 
click the malicious link. Individuals with a strong history of falling prey to phishing campaigns are most likely 
to be phished again. While employees who consistently behave in insecure ways are generally a minority of 
the populace, the total impact of employee mistakes is staggering. Ponemon research found that 63 percent 
of incidents recorded last year were caused by all categories of negligence. 
• Inadvertent: Simple negligence is the most common form of insider threat, and also the single most 
expensive category of employee risk. Insider threats who fit this category might generally exhibit secure 
behavior and comply with policy, but cause breaches due to isolated errors. Basic misjudgment — such as 
storing intellectual property on insecure personal devices or falling for phishing schemes — caused two-
thirds of breached records in 2017, according to the X-Force report. Threat actors are increasingly savvy to 
the vulnerabilities caused by inadvertent insiders. X-Force analysis of the most common criminal tactics used 
to exploit employee error  
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• Insider Collusion: Insider collaboration with malicious external threat actors is likely the rarest form of 
criminal insider risk, but it’s still a significant threat due to the increased frequency of attempts by 
professional cybercriminals to recruit employees via the dark web. Fraud rings tend to be highly 
sophisticated and organized and may embed their members in a number of roles within a bank. A fraud 
ring may seek to place a member in Human Resources, for instance, to make it easier to get members hired 
as loan officers, tellers …  or even loss prevention officers. Or knowing that the collections department has 
a weak background screening process and broad access to customer information, a fraud ring may try to 
place one of its members there solely to steal customer data.  
• Disgruntled Employees:  As a final category of criminal insiders, disgruntled employees who commit 
deliberate sabotage or intellectual property theft are also among the costliest risks to an organization. The 
Gartner analysis of criminal insiders found 29 percent of employees stole information after quitting or being 
fired for future gains, while 9 percent were motivated by simple sabotage. Disgruntled employees can fit 
many behavioral sub-patterns. Some frustrated employees may start digging for information access without 
specific goals. Other employees may have very specific data intent from the moment they give two weeks’ 
notice, and set out to sell trade secrets to competitors. 
• General Ledger Fraud Insiders may take advantage of the fact that while many employees have working 
knowledge of the accounts they access daily, they are often unfamiliar with other parts of the general ledger 
accounts. Certain insiders may have exclusive access to accounts payable or suspense accounts, which are 
used to temporarily record items such as loans in process, interdepartmental transfers, or currency in transit.  
• Account-Takeover 
Account takeover is another common internal fraud scheme, and often involves employees acting in 
collusion with outsiders for instance, a bank employee may open a deposit account for a customer and later 
set up online banking on the account without the customer's knowledge. The employee may then make 
unauthorized withdrawals from the account or give the online credentials to an external fraudster, who can 
use them to siphon money out of the account. In another scheme, the employee may sell a customer's PIN 
and account number to an external fraudster, change the address for the account and request a new check 
card. 
1.3 Impact on Insider Fraud  
According to Dr. Mike Gelles, a director with Deloitte Consulting, many financials today agree that insider fraud 
threat have a very high impact, but at the same time, believe that the likelihood of occurrence is very low. Thus, 
managing insider fraud threat does not become a priority for many organizations today. On the other hand 
(Blades M,2010) some security professionals, such as chief security officers, do recognize the importance of 
protecting against this type of threat but feel that insider threat is too difficult to manage. CSOs feel powerless 
to defend against insider threats because insiders can access the network without passing through the 
perimeter. The attacks are planned much in advance which allow them to cover their tracks and these insiders 
act based on a wide range of motivations that may be hard to predict. Since insider attacks are much more 
targeted because they know where the information is located, these attacks are likely to impose a greater impact 
compared to external attacks. As we can see from the growing number of insider threat incidents (Jennings, 
Frank 2008), such attitudes that organizations have against insider threats are no longer permissible. In fact, the 
2010 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report along with other studies concluded that it is costlier to fix insider 
attacks compared to external attacks.12 This is also confirmed by the e-crime Survey and Ponemon Institute’s 
2010 Cost of Cyber Crime Study. Therefore, it is critical for organizations to shift their mindset towards 
implementing a plan that will proactively prevent and detect these insider attacks (Kaplan, D 2011). 
The impact of Insider Fraud on financial Institution could include the following:  
• Loss of resources (financial, staffing and other assets);  
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• Reputation and brand damage;  
• Negative organizational culture;  
• Damage to financial Institution relationship with partners and stakeholders;  
• Disruption to service delivery;  
• Investigation costs; and Recruitment, retention and morale issues.  
 
1.4 Insider Fraud Policy 
The Insider Fraud Policy outlines how Financial Institutions will manage the risk of around Insider fraud. In 
minimizing incidents of fraud, Financial Institutions takes into consideration the three elements of the fraud 
triangle as shown below. The emphasis of the Insider Fraud and policy is the reduction of opportunities to 
commit fraud. Additionally, Financial Institutions policies and procedures as it relates to staff welfare shall also 
aim to minimize the pressure and rationalization elements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5 Risk Mitigant Approach to Insider Fraud Management/Handling   
Financial Institution approach to Insider fraud risk management is to develop a corporate anti-fraud culture and 
to prevent fraud by designing, implementing and continuously reviewing policies and systems that aid the 
achievement of these objectives. This is further supported by the Financial institution work to detect and 
investigate fraud and to seek to apply sanctions and as much as possible, recover losses arising therefrom.  
The Insider Fraud Risk Mitigant Approach shall combat the risk of fraud by:  
• Awareness and training;  
• Deterrence, prevention, detection and correction;  
• Investigation;  
• Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions. 
• Restrict access to personally identifiable information 
Insider 
Fraud 
Pressure 
Motivation or incentive to 
commit fraud 
Rationalization 
Personal justification of 
dishonest actions 
Opportunity  
Ability to execute plan without 
being caught 
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• Develop an insider incident response plan. 
• Sanction 
• Prosecution 
• Recovery of losses. 
• Implementation of behavioral monitoring systems 
Awareness and training;  
Financial Institutions are now   committed to ensuring that staff and management are aware of their 
responsibilities with regards to preventing fraud. To this end, the Financial Institutions will ensure that there is 
an on-going training programme for staff regarding measures to minimize the risk of fraud. The Financial 
Institutions also recognizes that it is exposed to risk from external partners and suppliers or third parties working 
for or on behalf of the Financial Institutions. To this end, the Financial Institutions will ensure there is an on-
going programme of awareness to ensure external partners and suppliers are aware of the Financial Institutions 
commitment to protect its funds against fraud. The Financial Institutions will continually utilize lessons from past 
experiences in fraud cases or attempted cases to build its knowledge management system, sharing same and 
using it for robust awareness campaigns. 
Deterrence, prevention, detection and correction;  
Financial Institutions should recognize that the most efficient way to protect its assets is to undertake a 
scheduled plan of prevention work. This plan will include a programme of work directed at deterring fraud. It 
will also include Insider fraud assessment work which will form part of the Insider Fraud annual routine process. 
The Fraud Prevention Plan shall be the responsibility of Key stakeholders and shall form an integral part of the 
Financial Institution fraud risk management, and shall include targeted deterrence, prevention, detection and 
fraud risk actions. Corrective actions are taken based on lesson learned from fraud cases to prevent reoccurrence. 
 
 
Insider Fraud Management  
Financial  Institution Objectives 
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Investigation 
Financial Institutions are committed to investigating all suspected occurrences of Insider fraud. The Financial 
Institutions will undertake all investigations pursuant to the Insider Fraud Policy and Response Plan contained 
in this manual and other relevant protocols.  
Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions. 
 Enforce account and password policies and procedures to associate online actions with the employees who 
performed them (Douglas Maughan 2012). Use logging, periodic monitoring, and auditing to discover and 
investigate suspicious insider actions early. Use data-leakage tools to detect unauthorized changes to systems 
and the download of confidential or sensitive information, such as intellectual property, customer or client data. 
Restrict access to personally identifiable information.  
Do not allow employees to accumulate privileges over time from moving across projects, between departments, 
or from taking new positions (Douglas Maughan 2012).. Ensure that employee privileges are necessary for their 
current job responsibilities. Protect PII from unauthorized access and establish controls that alert the proper 
personnel when PII is accessed, modified, or transmitted. 
Develop an insider incident response plan. 
 Develop an insider incident response plan to control the damage that results from malicious insider activity. 
Ensure that only those responsible for carrying out the plan understand and are trained on its execution (Douglas 
Maughan 2012). If an insider is suspected of committing fraud, ensure there is evidence in hand to identify the 
insider and follow up appropriate 
Sanctions 
Financial Institutions are committed to pursuing all possible sanctions for proven cases of fraud. The Financial 
Institutions shall pursue disciplinary, civil and criminal sanctions where there is evidence to support the 
occurrence of fraud. These sanctions will be sought on a case by case basis pursuant to the Bank’s Anti-Fraud 
Policy and Response Plan which shall provide guidance on the appropriate level of investigation of suspected 
cases. Sanctions shall be applied where applicable to the Financial Institutions staff in line with the Disciplinary 
Policy. 
Recovery of Loses  
The Financial Institutions is committed to minimizing potential losses due to fraud, and in cases of suspected 
fraud, take action to minimize the risk of further loss by recovering any funds lost due to fraud in line with the 
provisions of the Financial Institutions Insider Fraud Policy and Response 
Implementation of behavioral monitoring systems 
Conceiving the increasing number of insider fraudulent activities associated with the financial employee; the 
need to define a possible control to check the growing threat necessitated the Financial Institutions to upscale 
its controls to monitor the increasing number of customers’ accounts and internal employee activities on the 
core application of every Financial Institutions. To this end, the Financial Institutions are expected to engage an 
Enterprise Fraud Management vendor to provide an all-encompassing solution designed to monitor customer 
accounts, employee activities on core application, improve efficiency, and reduce insider frauds.  
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The Enterprise Fraud Management system engine should have rules library, business Rules/logic evaluations 
that analyzes the bank’s information (transaction, profiles and, reference data) using statistical calculations and 
machine learning capabilities such that when the rule conditions/set patterns are met, an exception incident is 
generated and circulated to the assurance functions in Financial Institutions. The alerts are immediately acted 
on to abort fraudulent intents / safeguard the interests of the Financial Institutions. 
Some suggested business scenario recommended for Financial Institutions, 
1. Account has excessive transactions of a certain category involving the same internal account (e.g. 
accounts with excessive credits from dormant accounts or internal accounts) 
2. Employee performs an irregular activity compared to employees with the same role type (e.g. teller 
posting foreign currency,  
3. Employee performs an irregular activity compared to employees with the same role type e.g. teller 
debiting into income accounts and expense accounts) 
4. Employee's related account has a monetary transaction in a certain category in an account that is not 
related to the employee (e.g. other inflows apart from salary)  
5. Employee's related account has a deposit with an above average amount for the category 
6. Employee performs an excessive number of withdrawals on a customer's accounts over the past day 
7. Employee changes the phone number on their related customer 
8. Employee performs fee reversal(s) on their related account 
9. Employee performs refund(s) on their related account 
10. Account has excessive transactions in a certain category that meet certain conditions. 
1.6 Contribution to the Knowledge 
The paper will contribute to the body of existing knowledge through the following ways: The paper contributes 
to the existing knowledge by expressing the views of different academic scholars with the regards to the Risk 
Mitigant Approach to Insider Fraud Management as such the paper may serve as a source of academic literature. 
The study will help the forensic accountants, auditors, fraud examiners and other anti-fraud bodies to 
understand the insider fraud management techniques thoroughly and approaches recommended, which will 
assist them in identifying and investigating the remote cause of fraud concealment and effective assessment of 
fraud risk. The paper may serve as guidance for further research to be carried out on the subject matter in areas 
that the study did not address. 
1.7 Conclusion 
To tackle insider fraud, financial Institutions must be sure that they understand their first responsibilities are to 
protect the privacy of their employees and the integrity and confidentiality of their corporate data. The global 
economy is becoming increasingly predicated on the storage and leverage of intangible assets, so organizations 
must go to great lengths to protect their data.  
Furthermore, by creating an inclusive culture of security and compliance that considers all aspects of the firm’s 
leadership, financial Institutions   will set themselves on the right path. But they must do more. Technology 
solutions that will complement internal risk mitigation can be invaluable; biometrics such as fingerprint scanning 
should be explored and implemented if feasible. financial Institutions   should also ensure that concepts such as 
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the ‘principle of least privilege’ are enforced across their entire workforce to ensure that employees or users are 
given access to the minimum amount of data access to be effective at their roles. Multi-factor authentication 
processes should also be enabled. As the insider threat level rises, financial Institutions   need to be more 
proactive 
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